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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Article (Section 2-710), but less any expense saved in consequence of
the buyer's breach, except that if the foregoing measure of damages is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would
have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reason-
able overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance
by the buyer."]
SECTION 2-709. Action for the Price.
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller
may recover, together with any incidental damages under the next section,
the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged
within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to
the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after
reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price, or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing.
Marble Card Elec. Corp. v. Maxwell Dynamometer Co., 15 Chester 145
(Pa..1961).
See Annotation to Section 2-314, supra.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course.
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
Perfect Market, Inc. v. Serra, 42 West Co. L.J. 35 (Pa. 1960).
Defendant had delivered its check in the amount of $2495 in pay-
ment for trailers to be built by a trailer company. Before completing
the work, the trailer company negotiated the check to another who in
turn cashed the check at plaintiff's store. Defendant had stopped pay-
ment of the check when none of the trailers were delivered. In plaintiff's
action on the check, defendant alleged that plaintiff store was not a
holder in due course. The question was submitted to the jury who re-
turned a verdict for the defendant. In denying plaintiff's motions for a
new trial and for judgment n.o.v., the court held that "observance of the
reasonable commercial standards" in Section 3-302 required an objec-
tive test of good faith that must be satisfied by a holder in due course.
The court concluded that, in view of the amount of the check and of the
practice among other stores, a question sufficient for jury determination
was presented by the evidence.
[N.13. This case was decided under the 1953 version of the Code
in which Section 3-302'provided:
"(1) A Holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
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(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable com-
mercial standards of any business in which the holder may be en-
gaged; . . ."1
[Annotator's Comment: This case illustrates the dangers inherent
in testing good faith by "observance of reasonable commercial stand-
ards." This test was omitted from the 1958 version of the Code and
good faith is made largely a subjective matter under its general defini-
tion of "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" (Sec-
tion 1-201(19)). The test was retained, however, as to merchants in a
sales transaction (Section 2-103(1) (b)). As to holders in due course,
jurors must decide whether the holder acted honestly in taking the in-
strument on the basis of the evidence dealing only with those circum-
stances. Commercial practices of other businesses or in the community
generally should be otherwise irrelevant.]
SECTION 3-306. Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course.
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the
instrument subject to
(a) all valid claims to it , on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an
action on a simple contract; and
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-perform-
ance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special
purpose (Section 3-408); and
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the
instrument, acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such
holder would be inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The
claim of any third person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a
defense to any party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends
the action for such party.
Paramount Distillers, Inc. v. Brookside Distilling Prod. Corp., 62 Lack.
Jur. 165 (Pa. 1961).
Plaintiff, payee on a judgment note, confessed judgment against
defendants, co-makers of the note. Defendants petitioned to open the
judgment and to allow defendants to defend alleging nonperformance of
a condition precedent.
The court allowed the judgment to be opened, basing its decision
upon Section 3-306 which provided that the defenses of nonperformance
of any condition precedent and of delivery for a special purpose are
available to the maker of a promissory note. The court noted that the
same was true und& the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.
SECTION 3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures.
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on an
instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue:
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under
the signature; but,
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(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except
where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who has
died or become incompetent before proof is required.
*Altex Aluminum Supply Co. v. Asay, 72 N.J. Super. 582, 178 A.2d 636
(1962).
Plaintiff, indorsee of a negotiable note made by defendant, sued
the maker for payment. The maker claimed, inter alia, that mere denial
of the corporate payee's indorsement required plaintiff to prove not only
that the indorsing signature of the corporate officer was genuine, but also
that such officer was actually authorized to execute the indorsement.
The court held that plaintiff could recover on the note as a holder
in due course upon the basis of New Jersey case law and statutes. The
court noted that the Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-307, effective
in New Jersey after this transaction arose, clarified New Jersey law, and
plaintiff would have no burden of proving the authenticity of the in-
dorser's signature or his authority to sign where the maker offered no
evidence in support of its denial.
SECTION 3-403. Signature by Authorized Representative.
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and
his authority to make it may be established as in other cases of representa-
tion. No particular form of appointment is necessary to establish such
authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an in-
strument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the
person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representa-
tive capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties,
is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but
does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or
if the instrument does not name the person represented but does show that
the representative signed in a representative capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established, the name of an organization pre-
ceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a
signature made in a representative capacity.
In the Matter of Laskin, 204 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Laskin executed the following note:
"$15,426.50	 March 31, 1959
Sixty days after the date promise to pay
to the order of Industrial Rayon Corporation Fifteen Thousand
Four Hundred Twenty-Six and 50/100 . . Dollars Payable at
Cleveland, Ohio with interest at 6% per annum.
Value received.
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LASKIN BROS. OF PHILA. INC.
HAROLD LASKIN
K 71730	 Due May 30, 1959"
Laskin became bankrupt and the payee filed a claim as Laskin's
creditor for the amount of the note. The referee in bankruptcy held that
the bankrupt was not liable on the note and that the payee was not his
creditor. The court held that the referee was in error under Section
3-403 by which a signer of a note under a corporation's name is liable
personally unless the signer's representative capacity is indicated.
Under section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law and under
the 1959 amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code in Pennsyl-
vania, parol evidence to show the capacity in which the party signed
would be admissible. Since the note was signed before the effective date
of the amendments, the bankrupt was personally liable and parol evi-
dence to the contrary was inadmissible.
[N.B. This case was decided under the 1953 version of the Code
in which Section 3-403 read as follows:
"(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to
an instrument is also personally obligated unless the instrument names
the person represented and shows that the signature is made in a rep-
resentative capacity. The name of an organization preceded or followed
by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made
in a representative capacity." Pennsylvania amended this section to
conform to the 1958 Official Text of the Code in 1959, effective Jan-
uary 1, 1960.]
[Annotator's Comment: Pennsylvania courts allowed parol evi-
dence between immediate parties to establish representative capacity
under Section 20 of the N.I.L. even though that section contained no
express exception as does Section 3-403(2) (b) of the 1958 Official Text
of the Code. The change from the 1953 version indicates that the drafts-
men had not intended to change the rule. The court could have reached
a different result had it seen fit to do so.]
SECTION 3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Un-
authorized Signature.
A person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a ma-
terial alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized sig-
nature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against
a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays the in-
strument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial
standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
*Gresham State Bank v. 0 and K Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 726 (Ore. 1962).
A bookkeeper had authority to deposit company's checks for
which he was given a stamp marked "for deposit only," and he also was
furnished a stamp bearing the name of the company. By using the com-
pany stamp, the bookkeeper cashed thirty checks over a three year period
at a nearby store at which he was known as defendant's employee. The
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store deposited the checks in its bank for collection. The bank collected
the proceeds and brought an interpleader action against the company
and the store, depositing the proceeds in court. The bank was discharged
and the lower court found in favor of the store. On appeal, the company
relied upon the rule that one who makes payment upon an unauthorized
indorsement of the payee's name is liable to the payee for conversion.
The court agreed that the bookkeeper had no apparent or implied au-
thority, but found that there was evidence that both parties had con-
tributed to the success of the forger, the company by its failure to super-
vise the employee, and the store by failing to inquire into the agent's
authority. But the court declined to apply the theory of contributory
negligence in the law of commercial paper.
Although the pertinent provisions of Section 3-406 are not effec-
tive in Oregon until September, 1963, the court adopted its principle for
two reasons. First, there were at that time no contrary statutes and no
Oregon decisions, and second, the Uniform Commercial Code represented
the most recent legislative pronouncement.
Despite the fact that the company's negligence was found to be
a "substantial contribution" to the forgery, this alone did not preclude
recovery under Section 3-406. The court took judicial notice that ob-
servance of the "reasonable commercial standards" imposed a duty to
inquire of the principal. This the store had failed to do and, since no
apparent or implied authority had been shown, the court held as a matter
of law that the store had not observed the reasonable commercial stand-
ards required by Section 3-406.
[Annotator's Comment: This decision points up the danger of
applying a section of the Code out of the context of the remainder of its
provisions. The court did not consider Section 3-419 which, while creat-
ing the liability in conversion of a collecting bank which takes an in-
strument with a forged indorsement, limits the liability of the bank to
proceeds remaining in its possession. In this case, the bank extracted
funds from the store's account without inquiry as to whether they were
the proceeds of the checks. Certainly, some of them were not. Of course,
assuming the court's application of Section 3-406 was correct, the store
would be liable to the company in conversion or to the bank in war-
ranty, and the bank would be liable in warranty to the various drawees
of the checks since the drawers apparently discovered the forged in-
dorsements within the three year statute of limitations provided in
Section 4-406. The court ignored the provision of Section 3-406 which
would preclude the company's recovery from a holder in due course, as-
suming its negligence substantially contributed to the forgery. "Ob-
servance of reasonable commercial standards" is not a test for such a
holder. See Annotation to Section 3-302, supra. Quaere, however, whether
one who takes under an unauthorized indorsement is ever a holder,
much less a holder in due course.]
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ARTICLE 4; BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-403. Customer's Right to Stop Payment; Burden of Proof
of Loss.
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item
payable for his account but the order must be received at such time and in
such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it-
prior to any action by the bank with respect to the item described in Section
4-303.
(2) An oral order is binding upon the bank only for fourteen calen-
dar days unless confirmed in writing within that period. A written order is
effective for only six months unless renewed in writing.
(3) The burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss result-
ing from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop payment order
is on the customer.
SECTION 4-404. Bank Not Obligated to Pay Check More Than Six
Months Old.
A bank is under no obligation to a customer having a checking account
to pay a check, other than a certified check, which is presented more than
six months after its date, but it may charge its customer's account for a
payment made thereafter in good faith.
Doodan v. Szawlinsky, 197 Pa. Super. 600, 179 A.2d 661 (1962).
The insurer of the losing defendant in a trespass action issued its
check for the amount of the policy, which was less than the judgment,
payable to the judgment creditor. The judgment creditor refused to in-
dorse it and his attorney in the trespass action brought suit against him
and instituted attachment by garnishment proceedings against the in-
surer. The insurer pleaded payment by issuance of the check which was
in the attorney's possession and which the attorney tendered to the in-
surer. Reversing the lower court, the Superior Court ordered judgment
on the pleadings for the plaintiff. The court held that the check was at
most conditional payment and since over a year had elapsed from the
time of issuance, the payor bank probably would not pay it because, un-
der Section 4-404, it had no obligation to honor a check over six months
old. The garnishee-insurer could stop payment under Section 4-403 for
its own protection.
ARTICLE 6: BULK TRANSFERS
SECTION 6-104. Schedule of Property; List of Creditors.
(1) Except as provided with respect to auction sales (Section 6-108),
a bulk transfer subject to this Article is ineffective against any creditor of
the transferor unless:
(a) the transferee requires the transferor to furnish a list of his
existing creditors prepared as stated in this section; and
(b) the parties prepare a schedule of the property transferred suf-
ficient to identify it; and
III
